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Abstract
This paper extends the prey—predator model of Grossman and
Kim (1995) to analyze the relation between the value of the con-
tested rent and the emergence of a conflict. We show that an
increase in the value of the rent makes the conflict equilibrium
more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the
rent is diﬀerent for the two players. We find, for example, that a
conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an
important disadvantage in warfare. That’s when its valuation of
the rent is suﬃciently high compare to that of the prey.
1 Introduction
The economics of conflict is build on the idea that individuals, tribes or
states, allocate their endowments between productive and appropriative
activities. One of the main issue is to derive the factors that determine
the emergence of conflicts. We adopt the framework of Grossman and
Kim (1995, henceforth GK). Two agents divide their endowments in
time and eﬀort between the appropriation of an exogenous rent and the
production. The eﬀort allocated by the prey is used to defend his initial
claims to resources. He moves first and takes into account the reaction
of the predator.
We use this analytical framework to address the following questions:
What is the relation between the value of the rent and the type of equi-
librium, whether a conflict or a no conflict equilibrium? Under what
conditions the conflict equilibrium prevails? Does the existence of an
asymmetry with respect to the valuation of the rent influence the prob-
abilities of winning?
By our analysis, we want first to explain the fact that natural re-
sources are important factors of conflict between groups. One may then
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understand the causes of civil wars between a government and rebels.
The government can be considered as a first mover player who pro-
vides military defense with the objective to protect primary commodity.
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) studied the relationship between natural re-
sources and the risk of rebellion. They show that the level of dependence
on primary commodity exports aﬀects the risk of conflict.
The present paper builds on GK who distinguish between oﬀensive
and defensive activities. They show that security of claims to property
does not depend on the size of the contested resource. There is no conflict
when the prey has some advantage in that the relative eﬀectiveness of his
weapons is greater than a threshold level which is, however, independent
of the value of the contested resource. In this paper, by considering a
more general specification for the production technology, we show that
the relative eﬀectiveness of prey’s weapons and the value of the rent
matter when analyzing the type of equilibrium that obtains.
Many authors has adopted the prey-predator framework of GK to
analyze the relation between the size of the contested resource and the
security of claims to property. Their results rests on strong assumptions.
Olsson (2007) extends the prey-predator model of GK for her empirical
analysis of the relationship between diamond abundance and economic
growth. In her theoretical analysis, she shows that whether a conflict
equilibrium emerges or not depends on the size of the natural resources
under the control of the ruler and contested by rebel. The size eﬀect
on equilibrium is captured with a strong assumption : rebel and his
opponent in arms, named citizen, have diﬀerent production functions.
The production of the rebel comes from a subsistence activity that is,
as in GK, linear in labor. But the production function of the formal
sector is of Cobb-Douglas type and, then, depends on labor and capital.
This assumption permits the derivation of a closed form solution for
the reaction of rebel and makes the profit function of ruler concave.
Baker (2003) assumes that the relative eﬀectiveness of the defending
group depends negatively on the size of the defended parcel. He shows
that larger territories are less likely to be geographically stable. Konrad
(2002) adopts a rather diﬀerent contest success function that allows the
prey to win without any eﬀort. He comes to a similar prediction: an
increase in the prize under contest increases the likelihood of a conflict.
Caselli and Coleman (2006) analyze the role of ethnic cleavage in the
likelihood of conflict between a dominant group and a weak group whose
members have the possibility to switch to the dominant group. They
show that, all other things equal, the probability of conflict is inverted-
U shaped in the size of the prize.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the section
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2, we specify the model and notation. Section 3 derives the Stackelberg
equilibrium and its properties. Section 4 presents a comparative statics
analysis. Section 5 analyzes the case with diﬀerent valuations of the
rent. Section 6 concludes the paper and suggestions for future research
are presented.
2 The model
There are two collective entities or "tribes" X, the prey, and Y , the
potential predator, with NX and NY their labor endowments. They
divide their initial endowments between productive and appropriative
activities. Let fX(.) be the production function of the prey. We assume
that fX is strictly increasing and concave. The production function of
the predator fY (.) is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave with
f 000Y ≤ 0. One have x + LX = NX and y + LY = NY , where x and y
are the allocations to appropriative activities and LX and LY are the
allocations in productive activities. An exogenous rent E is subject to
appropriation. We consider a two stage game in which agent X moves
first and determines his defensive eﬀorts.
The winning probability p of agent X takes the following form:
p =
1
1 + θy/x
where θ is a positive parameter that indicates the eﬀectiveness of the
predator’s weapons against the prey’s weapons.
The final expected wealth for X and Y are respectively
UX = pE + fX(LX) (1)
and
UY = (1− p)E + fY (LY ) (2)
3 Equilibrium
To analyze the allocation of time and eﬀort to appropriative activities,
we begin by considering the second-stage choice of the agent Y . At this
second stage, this agent Y takes x as given and chooses y to maximize
UY , subject to the constraints y ≥ 0 and y ≤ NY . We are interested
in deriving the conditions under which a conflict does not occur in the
equilibrium. That is when the predator allocates no resources to oﬀensive
activities. When we deal with internal and domestic conflicts, the latter
situation means that the predator “surrender” and gives the prey free
reign on the country’s resource.
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Since πY is strictly concave in the strategy y, the maximizer is unique.
The solution is characterized by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the max-
imization problem in (2):
∂UY
∂y
= −∂p
∂y
E − f 0Y (LY ) = 0, 0 < y < NY
or
∂UY
∂y
= −∂p
∂y
E − f 0Y (LY ) ≤ 0, y = 0
or
∂UY
∂y
= −∂p
∂y
E − f 0Y (LY ) ≥ 0, y = NY
We have
∂UY
∂y
(y = 0) =
θ
x
E − f 0Y (NY ) > 0⇔ x < θE/f 0Y (NY )
Let x∗ = θE/f 0Y (NY ). Two cases hold.
Proposition 1 When x∗ is greater than NX, then in equilibrium a con-
flict always takes place.
This case holds either if the rent E is high enough or if the relative
eﬀectiveness θ of the predator is high enough. The production technology
also plays an important role in that the conflict equilibrium prevails when
the predator has a low productivity. The result of Proposition 1 shows
that a rich tribe, or country, has no chance to ensure peaceful coexistence
with neighborhoods who are good at warfare and with low productivity.
In the second case, x∗ is not greater than NX . We assume that the
constraint y ≤ NY is not binding1. In this case, we obtain:
Proposition 2 Given the allocation x of the prey, the optimal reaction
y of the potential predator is null for x ≥ x∗ and strictly positive for
0 < x < x∗ with x and y verifying
θEx = (x+ θy)2f 0Y (LY ) (3)
For the remainder of the paper we assume that x∗ not greater that
NX . If the prey chooses x smaller than x∗, then the best reaction of the
predator is to choose y given by equation (3) and hence a conflict occurs.
But if x is not smaller than x∗, then y = 0 and the predator allocates
all her time endowment in production.
1A suﬃcient condition is that the endowment of the predator in time and eﬀort
is suﬃciently high, that is 4NY > E/f 0Y (0).
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We consider now the choice of the first stage of the prey. At this first
stage, the agent X chooses his defensive eﬀorts x to maximize expected
wealth subject to the constraint that 0 ≤ x ≤ NX . When choosing x,
the agent X takes into account the reaction of the potential predator
describing above.
If x ≥ x∗, then y = 0 and p = 1. Equation (1) implies that the
expected wealth of the prey is a decreasing function of x. Consequently,
the optimal choice of the prey is obtained at x not greater than x∗.
Let’s begin by showing that the constraint x ≥ 0 is not binding. We
have:
Lemma 1 When x → 0, then y → 0 and y/x→ +∞.
Furthermore, we have:
Lemma 2 In the limit as x approaches zero, the derivative of UX with
respect to x becomes infinite.
It follows from lemma 2 that the optimal choice of X is positive. We
show next that the type of equilibrium, with or without conflict, depends
on the sign of the (left-hand) derivative of UX at x = x∗.
Consider first the case in which the (left-hand) derivative dUX/dx
is negative for x = x∗. The X’s expected wealth πX has an interior
maximum at a value of x that satisfiesµ
∂p
∂x
+
∂p
∂y
dy
dx
¶
E = f 0X(LX) with 0 < x < x
∗ (4)
The first term inside the parentheses captures the direct eﬀect of greater
defensive eﬀorts x by the prey on his winning probability. The second
term represents the strategic eﬀect of greater defensive eﬀorts through
its impact on the predator’s reaction. In this case, the prey chooses
his defensive eﬀorts x such that the marginal benefit of x equals the
marginal opportunity cost of the foregone production. Given that x is
smaller than x∗, the conflict equilibrium takes place.
Consider second the case in which the (left-hand) derivative dUX/dx
is not negative at x = x∗. We need the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 For the prey X, the marginal benefit of x in increasing his
winning probability is superior to his marginal benefit at x = x∗, for all
0 < x < x∗.
Let R =
∂p
∂x
+
∂p
∂y
dy
dx
. By Lemma 3 it comes that R(x) > R(x∗) ≥
f 0X(NX−x∗) ≥ f 0X(NX−x), for all 0 < x < x∗. Hence dUX/dx is positive
5
for all 0 < x < x∗ and the expected wealth of the prey is then strictly
increasing. Consequently, the prey chooses his defensive eﬀorts x equal
to x∗, and hence there exists no conflict in equilibrium. We summarize
the preceding analysis with the following
Lemma 4 The type of equilibrium, with or without conflict, depends on
the sign of the (left-hand) derivative of UX at x = x∗. The no conflict
equilibrium holds if and only if this derivative is not negative.
4 Comparative statics
We show easily2 that the (left-hand) derivative of UX for x = x∗ is given
by
dUX
dx
(x = x∗) =
f 0Y (NY )
θ
£
2−Ef 00Y (NY )/ [f 0(NY )]
2¤ − f 0X(NX − θE/f 0Y (NY ))
(5)
Let’s consider the special case in which f 0X = f
0
Y ≡ 1. In this case, ex-
plicit solution for equation (3) and well-behaved reduced-form expected
wealth function are obtained. Eq. (5) becomes:
dUX
dx
(x = x∗) =
1
2θ
− 1
We then obtain the result derived by GK:
Proposition 3 When marginal production functions are constant and
equal to 1, the type of equilibrium is independent of the value of the rent.
In equilibrium, a conflict does not takes place if and only if θ ≤ 1/2.
In contrast, when production functions are nonlinear, the value of
the rent may matter. Figures 1 illustrates the following results.
Proposition 4 For a given value of θ, there are two cases:
i) If θ ≥ f
0
Y (NY )
2f 0X(NX)
, then the conflict equilibrium holds for all values of the
rent.
ii) If θ < f
0
Y (NY )
2f 0X(NX)
, there exists a threshold level E∗ that determines which
of the two equilibria holds. A conflict does not take place if and only if the
value of the rent E is not greater than E∗. θ and E∗ are monotonically
and negatively related.
2See the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
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Proposition 5 For a given value of E, there exists a threshold level θ∗
that determines which of the two equilibria prevails . A conflict does not
take place if and only if θ is not greater than θ∗. Furthermore, θ∗ and
E are monotonically and negatively related.
.
No conflict
Conflict
)(E∗=θθ
θ
)(θ∗= EE E
( )
2 ( )
Y Y
X X
f N
f N
′
′
Figure 1: Conflict or no conflict
Propositions 5 shows that the value of the rent is a major determi-
nant of the risk of conflict. Tribes initially well-endowed with resources
have a much higher risk of aggression than tribes poorly endowed. More
resources require a better fighting eﬃciency for the prey troops to avoid
conflict. The intuition is the following: when the value of the rent is
high, the predator has a strong incentive to divert some resources away
from production and toward appropriative activities. It follows that the
prey needs a high investment in defensive eﬀorts to induce the prey to
allocate no eﬀort to predation. But in this situation, a small eﬀort is de-
voted to production. Since the production function exhibits decreasing
marginal productivity, the marginal returns from productive activities
will be greater than the marginal returns from defensive eﬀorts. Conse-
quently, the prey prefers to moderate his investment in defensive arms
and then aggression occurs.
Considering more general specifications for production technology
yields another striking result which contrasts with the result obtained
in the Proposition 2. The incumbent may have incentives to deter entry
even though it does not exist an advantage for the eﬀectiveness of its
armies. For example, the no conflict equilibrium may hold for θ larger
than one. That’s when f
0
Y (NY )
2f 0X(NX)
is larger than θ and the size of the rent
smaller than E∗ (see figure 1).
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) have investigated the causes of civil con-
flicts. The result of Propositions 4 and 5 may provide rational for their
empirical findings. They found that a country with no natural resource
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exports has a very low probability of a war-start, about one percent. But
for countries with a dependence on the primary commodity export, with
a share of 32 percent, the risk of civil war is much higher (about 22 per-
cent). If rebels are motivated by natural resources extortion, then these
findings are conform with our theoretical results. Collier and Hoeﬄer
found that countries with a very high dependence on natural resource
incomes have a relatively lower risk of conflict. Based on our results, a
plausible explanation is that, for these countries, the relative eﬀective-
ness of government defenses are suﬃciently high and then x∗ ≤ NX and
θ ≤ θ∗. Also, they found that geographic variables aﬀect the risk of
conflict. When geographic conditions strengthen rebels, increased popu-
lation dispersion and mountainous terrain, the risk of conflict increases.
Our model suggests that helpful geographic conditions for rebels is syn-
onym of an increase in the relative eﬀectiveness of their arms. Our
theoretical analysis predicts that the likelihood of a rebellion increases.
5 Asymmetric valuations of the rent
Consider now the case where the valuation of the rent is diﬀerent for
the two players3 but agents have perfect information about their oppo-
nent’s valuations. Let EX and EY represent the valuation of the rent
respectively by the prey and the predator. In this case, x∗ becomes equal
to θEY /f 0Y (NY ). Hence, as the valuation of the predator increases, the
prey must increase his defensive eﬀorts to induce the predator not to
have appropriative activities. Analogous calculations as in the symmet-
ric valuations case yield:
dUX
dx
(x = x∗) =
f 0Y (NY )
θ
£
2−EY f 00Y (NY )/ [f 0Y (NY )]
2¤ µEXEY
¶
−f 0X(NX−θEY /f 0Y (NY ))
(6)
Comparing Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), we see that asymmetric valuations
introduce an additional term—the ratio of prey’s valuation to the preda-
tor’ valuation—compare with the case with symmetric valuations. In
addition, the other two terms on the right-hand side depends on the val-
uation of the predator but not of the prey. From Eq. (6) we can deduce
that the relative eﬀectiveness of the predator’s armies, θ, the predator’s
valuation, EY , and the ratio of the two valuations, EX/EY , determine
the type of equilibrium. The introduction of an asymmetry with respect
to the valuations of the rent may then modify the type of equilibrium
that obtains. When agents are more diﬀerent in their valuation of the
3Stein (2002) and Meland and Straume (2005) analyze contests with asymmetric
valuations.
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rent, other things equal, with the predator who has the highest valua-
tion, the likelihood of the conflict equilibrium increases. To focus on the
impact of the eﬀectiveness of armies and diﬀerence in valuations, let us
consider, following GK, the special case where marginal productions are
constant and equal to 1. Using Eq. (6), one can easily show that the
winning probability of the prey is
p = min
∙
1,
1
2θ
EX
EY
¸
(7)
GK analyze the symmetric case and comes to the result that the type of
equilibrium does not depend on the value of the rent. However, by Eq.
(7), when the prey and the predator are asymmetric with respect to their
valuations, the type of equilibrium depends both on the eﬀectiveness of
their armies and on the ratio of their valuations of the rent. The conflict
equilibrium may emerge even though the predator has a clear disadvan-
tage for the eﬀectiveness of her armies. That’s when her valuation of
the rent is suﬃciently high per respect to that of the prey. Furthermore,
the probability that the predator wins increases if her valuation of the
rent increases, other things equal.
This result is consistent with casual empiricism. Columbus’ discovery
of the New World led other explorers from Spain to the new world and
these explorers, motivated by the desire for gold, conquered the existing
ancient civilizations. The Spanish advantage of having horses and guns
has been detrimental for their success. But the fact that Incas do not
value gold has also influenced the issue of the confrontation. This evi-
dence shows that warfare technology and the valuations of the resource
matter for the security of property.
6 Conclusion and extension
In this paper, we show that the value of the contested rent matters
when analyzing a prey-predator model. An increase in the value of the
rent makes the conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the
case where the valuation of the rent is diﬀerent for the two players. We
find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the
predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That’s when her
valuation of the rent is suﬃciently high compare to that of the prey.
This paper has not addressed the related issue of the impact of the
value of the rent on welfare. Since the value of the rent has influences
the likelihood of conflict, one may expect that its existence may have a
negative impact on welfare. Several empirical studies have indicated a
negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic
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growth (Sachs and Warner, 1997, 2001). However, we show easily that
in the context of this model, the gain from the rent outweigh the op-
portunity cost of arming and then welfare with a rent Pareto superior
welfare without the rent4.
In this paper we assume that no trade takes place between adversaries
whether a conflict occurs or not. The relationship between trade and
conflict has been examined by Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996, 2001)
in the context of a contest on a part or all the productive resource. The
prospect of trade aﬀects the equilibrium allocation and then Skaperdas
and Syropoulos compare welfare under trade and welfare under autarky.
An extension to the present analysis is to study the relationship between
trade, conflict and the value of the contested resource by integrating the
negative impact of conflict on trade. Glick and Taylor (2005) find large
negative impact of wars on trade5. One may then obtain the result that
welfare without rent Pareto superior welfare with a rent. Exploring these
issues in detail, however, is left for future work.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Eq. (3) yields θEx ≥ θ2y2f 0Y (LY ) ≥ θ2y2f 0Y (NY ). Hence 0 < y2 ≤
Ex/(θf 0Y (NY )). It follows that y → 0 for x→ 0. Also, it comes from Eq.
(3) that θy/x =
p
θE/(xf 0Y (LY )) − 1. Since xf 0Y (LY ) → 0 for x → 0,
hence y/x→ +∞ for x → 0.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Let R =
∂p
∂x
+
∂p
∂y
dy
dx
. Using Eq. (3) and by applying the envelope
theorem, we obtain the derivative dy/dx and then we have
R=
θy
(x+ θy)2
− f
0
Y (LY )
E
½
θE − 2(x+ θy)f 0Y (LY )
2θ(x+ θy)f 0Y (LY )− (x+ θy)2f 00Y (LY )
¾
=
y
x
f 0Y (LY )
E
− f
0
Y (LY )
E
½
θE(x+ θy)− 2θEx
2θ(θEx)− θEx(x+ θy)f 00Y (LY )/f 0Y (LY )
¾
=
y
x
f 0Y (LY )
E
− f
0
Y (LY )
E
½
θE(θy/x− 1)
2θ2E − θE(x+ θy)f 00Y (LY )/f 0Y (LY )
¾
HenceR = A+B withA =
y
x
f 0Y (LY )
E
∙
1− θ
2θ − (x+ θy)f 00Y (LY )/f 0Y (LY )
¸
and B =
f 0Y (LY )
E
∙
1
2θ − (x+ θy)f 00Y (LY )/f 0Y (LY )
¸
. By Lemma 1, it
comes that B → f
0
Y (NY )
2θE and A→ +∞ for x→ 0.
4For the proof see the Appendix.
5See also Pollins (1989a, 1989b), van Bergeijk (1994), and Mansfield and Bronson
(1997)
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C Proof of Lemma 3
For x = x∗, A = 0 and B =
f 0Y (NY )
E
∙
1
2θ − x∗f 00Y (NY )/f 0Y (NY )
¸
. For
0 < x < x∗, A > 0. We then need to show that
f 0Y (LY )
E
∙
1
2θ − (x+ θy)f 00Y (LY )/f 0Y (LY )
¸
≥ f
0
Y (NY )
E
∙
1
2θ − x∗f 00Y (NY )/f 0Y (NY )
¸
Since f 0Y (LY ) ≥ f 0Y (NY ) and f 00Y (LY ) ≥ f 00Y (NY ), it suﬃces that (x +
θy) ≤ x∗ for each (x, y) verifying Eq. (3). Eq. (3) yields θEx = (x +
θy)2f 0Y (LY ) and θEx
∗ = (x∗)2f 0Y (NY ). Consequently, for 0 < x < x
∗,
we get (x+ θy)2f 0Y (LY ) ≤ θEx∗ = (x∗)2f 0Y (NY ) ≤ (x∗)2f 0Y (LY ).
D Welfare analysis
When the valuable resource E does not exist, all the endowment in time
is allocated to productive activities; hence, one has UX = fX(NX) and
UY = fY (NY ). Let analyze the impact of the rent on welfare. For this, we
study the change in welfare when the value of the rent becomes positive.
By the Lemma 1, it comes that the winning probability p of the prey
approaches zero as x tends to zero, and hence, his expected welfare tends
to fX(NX). Lemma 2 gives that UX is increasing for x suﬃciently small.
It follows that the prey benefits from the existence of the contested rent,
whether a conflict takes place or not. For the predator, her expected
welfare is not modified when a conflict does not occur in equilibrium.
We show next that her expected welfare increases when a conflict takes
place in equilibrium. By the mean-value theorem and the fact that the
function f 0Y is nonincreasing, we have fY (NY ) − fY (LY ) < yf 0Y (LY ).
Eq. (3) yields f 0Y (LY ) = θEx/(x + θy)
2. Since y > 0, it follows that
(x+ θy)2 > x(x+ θy), and therefore fY (NY )− fY (LY ) < (1− p)E.
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